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THE GO-BETWEEN: JAN ELIASSON AND THE STYLES OF MEDIATION 
By 
Garret Brouwer* 
 
 War and conflict have existed as long as humanity. Sometimes these 
conflicts can be solved with words. Unfortunately, many others are solved with 
weapons. With the rise of modern technology in the 20th century, the world has 
become smaller than ever. Humans can instantaneously communicate with one 
another across the planet. Economies are increasingly dependent on international 
trade and cooperation. Nation states have vested political interests in their 
neighbors and trading partners.  Interconnectivity has made it more important than 
ever for conflicts to be resolved as quickly and painlessly as possible. The less a 
conflict costs, both economically and socially, the better for everyone involved. 
One method to limit these costs is international mediation. International powers 
and organizations have increasingly been using mediation as a means to resolve a 
wide range of disputes.  
One individual who has become synonymous with these efforts is Jan 
Eliasson. Mr. Eliasson has held several prestigious posts in his lifetime and has 
been involved with a number of high profile mediation efforts with various 
organizations. He has worked extensively with the United Nations as the Swedish 
ambassador.1 While with the United Nations, he served as the under-Secretary-
General of the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Most recently, 
Mr. Eliasson served as the President of the UN General Assembly, Sweden’s 
foreign minister and as a special envoy for the UN Secretary-General in Darfur.2  
In addition to his extensive experience with the UN, Mr. Eliasson has also worked 
with many regional organizations. In 1994 he helped the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe resolve various conflicts. Throughout the course of his 
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1 ISAK SVENSSON & PETER WALLENSTEEN, THE GO-BETWEEN: JAN ELIASSON AND THE 
STYLES OF MEDIATION  4 (United States Institute of Peace Press 2010). 
2 Id. at 6. 
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career, Mr. Eliasson has also been continuously involved with academia. Uppsala 
University Department of Peace and Conflict Research and the United States 
Institute of Peace have both benefitted from Mr. Eliasson’s presence and 
contributions.3 The Go-Between: Jan Eliasson and the Styles of Mediation uses the 
work of Mr. Eliasson to explore the use of international mediation.  
The authors of this book are also highly respected in the field of 
international mediation and conflict studies. Peter Wallensteen is a faculty member 
at Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. Mr. Wallensteen 
also teaches in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala 
University in Sweden.4 Isak Svensson directs research at Otago University’s 
National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies in New Zealand. Mr. Svensson also 
teaches at Upssala University’s Department of Peace and Conflict Research.5  
 
I. PREFACE 
 
This book begins with a few insightful words from the former UN 
Secretary-General, Kofi A. Annan. Mr. Annan notes that the number of conflicts 
resolved through mediation has increased dramatically in the latter half of the 20th 
century. He credits this trend to the recognition that nations of our world are 
dependent on one another.6 No longer can the world powers ignore Africa or Asia. 
When they do, those regions become terrorist training hubs. Outbreaks of deadly 
diseases in remote parts of the world can spread as quickly as a plane can fly. 
Economic downturns in a world power can negatively impact nations all over the 
globe.7 In order to ensure the security of our own countries, we must ensure 
                                                 
3 Id. at xii – xiii. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 SVENSSON & WALLENSTEEN, supra note 1, at ix. 
7 Id.  
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security in the countries around us as well. Mediation is just one way to establish 
security during or after a conflict.8  
Despite the importance of mediation in conflict resolution, Mr. Annan is 
well aware that mediation is not always a satisfactory tool. There have been many 
instances in which mediation has failed to render any result, let alone a positive 
one. Even though mediation is not always effective, it is still an important tool. For 
that reason, he believes books on international mediation, such as this one, are 
important.9 Mediation helps parties understand one another. Mr. Annan also notes 
that successful mediations are largely about the right set of facts and not just the 
machinations of a talented mediator.10  
 
II. INTRODUCTION 
 
The introduction lays out an effective roadmap for the book. It explains the 
goals and methods the authors use. Svensson and Wallensteen focus on how 
mediators go about conducting their mediations. Style and process are important to 
the authors. In order to fully understand style and process, the authors believe it is 
important to use real life examples.11 That is where Jan Eliasson comes in. 
One of the main reasons for the book is the perceived disconnect between 
the practice and theory of mediation. Many practitioners are not familiar with the 
ongoing academic discourse. Similarly, many academics are not exposed, or 
ignore, the realities of international mediation.12 The authors hope to narrow that 
gap with this book. 
In order to comingle theory and practice, Svensson and Wallensteen  use 
the real world experiences of Jan Eliasson to illustrate mediation theories. All of 
                                                 
8 Id.  
9 Id. at ix-iix. 
10 Id. at iix. 
11 SVENSSON & WALLENSTEEN, supra note 1, at xi-xii. 
12 Id. at xi. 
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the experiences in the book relate to international mediations. While there are 
many similarities between all of the chosen examples, each of them is unique in its 
own way. Mediation efforts vary depending on a wide array of factors, including 
the nature of the parties involved, who initiated the mediation and how it is being 
conducted.13 These all play an important role in the success or failure of mediation. 
 
III. ONE MEDIATOR, SIX EXPERIENCES 
 
According to Svannson and Wallensteen, international mediations can be 
full of surprises. To illustrate this point, the chapter starts off with an anecdote 
about Mr. Eliasson’s trip to Iraq in 1989 to discuss UN Security Council 
Resolution 598.14 He was there as the personal representative of the UN Secretary-
General in hopes of resolving the ongoing conflict between Iraq and Iran. Mr. 
Eliasson, accompanied by a small delegation, was greatly outnumbered by Saddam 
Hussein and his cadre of generals. A series of poor translations created a tense 
situation. Saddam angrily demanded that Mr. Eliasson and his entourage follow 
him immediately. Wary of what to expect, Mr. Eliasson obliged the general to 
prevent further incident. Instead of leading Eliasson to an underground torture 
facility, Saddam took the delegation to a room with a map of the Middle East. He 
proceeded to explain to Eliasson the dangers of giving up territory to Iran and how 
this loss would leave his country vulnerable to further attack.15 Instead of allowing 
a poor translation to ruin negotiations, Mr. Eliasson successfully turned it into an 
opportunity to learn about a party’s needs, desires and fears. 
This anecdote was used to illustrate the sensitivity and complexity of 
international mediations. One poor translation or cultural faux-pas can derail the 
process. It is important for an international mediator to understand this sensitivity 
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and account for it. Being able to think on your feet, read situations and remain 
calm are crucial to successful mediations.16  
Research has shown mediation to be highly successful in resolving, 
avoiding or ending armed conflicts. Initiating communication between parties has 
been proven vital to conflict resolution. As mediation becomes more mainstream, 
there are ever increasing amounts of data on the subject, which has proved helpful 
in assessing the effectiveness of different strategies and styles.17  
All mediators have their own unique style. This style affects everything, 
including the way they treat the parties, the way they define their mandates and 
how they prioritize the issues in a given situation. Svensson and Wallensteen chose 
to focus on what they believe to be the four key style dimensions to any mediation: 
scope, method, mode, and focus.18 They frame much of their analysis and 
discussion in these terms. 
The authors focus on six separate diplomatic missions of Jan Eliasson. The 
first two were separate efforts to resolve an interstate, armed conflict between Iran 
and Iraq. On the first mission, occurring from 1980-1982, Mr. Eliasson served as 
the personal advisor to the former Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme. This 
mission was tasked with eliciting short term, good-will agreements as well as a 
long-term settlement.19 
Following the untimely death of Olof Palme, Eliasson returned to the 
Middle East from 1988-1991. During this time Eliasson was the Swedish 
ambassador to the UN. Eliasson was specially selected by the UN Secretary-
General to represent him personally. This trip largely involved shuttle diplomacy 
between Baghdad and Tehran. The UN was hoping to convince both parties to 
                                                 
16 SVENSSON & WALLENSTEEN, supra note 1, at 2. 
17 Id. at 2-3. 
18 Id. at 4. 
19 Id. at 4-5. 
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embrace UN Resolution 598, which called for direct talks between the two 
countries.20 
In addition to interstate, armed conflict mediations, there are two 
humanitarian mediations discussed in the book. The first mediation involved two 
Asian countries: Burma/Myanmar and Bangladesh. After a period of political 
upheaval in Burma/Myanmar, the new government expelled a large ethnic 
population of Rohingyas from the northern part of their country. This wave of 
refugees placed a significant burden on the Bangladeshi government and 
heightened tensions between the two countries. Jan Eliasson was sent in to defuse 
the conflict.21 
Probably the highest profile mediation that Mr. Eliasson took part in were 
his efforts to end the conflict in Darfur. He actually participated in two rounds of 
mediation in Sudan. The first occurred in 1992 and the second occurred from 
2007-2008.22 Fighting between government and rebel forces created a 
humanitarian crisis for the civilian population. Not only were civilians being 
caught in the cross fire, but a large portion of the population was on the brink of 
starvation. Eliasson had the dual task of attempting to end the fighting, as well as 
ensuring that international aid groups would be able to deliver food and medical 
supplies.23 
While working with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, Eliasson served as a mediator for an intrastate conflict in Azerbaijan. After 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was ethnic unrest in many areas. Ethnic 
Armenians wanted independence from the national government, but the 
government was unwilling to compromise its territorial integrity.24 Armed conflict 
was the result. The conflict created instability in the region and intensified 
relations between Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia. Eliasson was sent with the 
                                                 
20 Id. at 5. 
21 SVENSSON & WALLENSTEEN, supra note 1, at 5. 
22 Id. at 5-6. 
23 Id. at 5. 
24 Id. at 6. 
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hope that he would be able to mediate an end to the conflict. It was important to 
ensure that the conflict did not erupt into an interstate conflict.25 
The aforementioned mediations were chosen by the authors for their 
variety. No two are the same, and they all present different challenges to a 
mediator.26 Throughout the book the authors use excerpts from interviews with Mr. 
Eliasson and also his personal diary entries. These provide professional and 
personal insight into complex mediation issues.27 Outcomes are not as important to 
the authors as the process. While successful mediations are always rewarding, 
sometimes more can be learned from failures. Using the same mediator provides a 
form of control in their analysis.28 
 
IV. HOW MEDIATORS MEDIATE: STYLES OF MEDIATION 
 
In the international context, most mediations are initiated through 
mandates, which can come from a variety of sources. The source of the mandate is 
crucial to the success and perception of the mission.29 Parties to a conflict can be 
skeptical of outside intervention, which can raise questions of motivation and 
hidden agendas. If the mandate comes from a well-respected organization with 
respectable intentions, parties tend to be much more accepting of assistance.30 
Mandates guide the mediator in his mission. While mandates are all 
different, they can provide the mediator with his authority and a general template 
of how to carry out the mediation.31 They can come from international 
organizations, such as the UN, or can be provided by the parties themselves. 
External mandates are generally more public in nature, while internal mandates are 
                                                 
25 Id.  
26 SVENSSON & WALLENSTEEN, supra note 1, at 7. 
27 Id. at 8. 
28 Id. at 9. 
29 Id. at 12. 
30 Id.  
31 SVENSSON & WALLENSTEEN, supra note 1, at 13. 
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much more secretive. Parties that request mediation on their own generally want to 
keep the proceeding under wraps to avoid a perception of weakness.32 It is 
important to note that mandates are not always required to initiate mediation. 
Unofficial third party intervention has been effective and does not require a 
mandate. Organizations such as the Carter Center and the Conflict Management 
Initiative are examples of well-respected third party mediators.33 
There are two main types of international mediation: political and 
humanitarian. Political mediation can take a variety of forms. Parties can use 
political mediation to end armed conflict, to maintain territorial sovereignty, or to 
implement a resolution of some sort.34 Humanitarian conflicts are generally less 
contentious. These are usually initiated by organizations on the ground where the 
crisis is taking place, and less so by other countries.35 
The scope of a mediation is an important strategic consideration. Deciding 
which parties to include or exclude from a mediation can play a large role in its 
success or failure. Neither option is mutually exclusive. Svensson and Wallensteen 
provide some examples of cases in which parties began with an exclusive scope 
and gradually broadened it to incorporate outsiders once trust had been 
established.36 Sometimes when negotiations stall, it is helpful to bring international 
or regional powers into the fold. This can serve as a catalyst to further 
negotiation.37 
Method of mediation is generally a stylistic choice of the mediator. Some 
mediators choose a more aggressive approach.38 This includes the use of deadlines 
and even the threat of withdrawal if the parties do not show progress. “Real 
deadlines” can be problematic, however. Sometimes these deadlines motivate 
                                                 
32 Id. at 13-4.  
33 Id. at 14. 
34 Id. at 15. 
35 Id.  
36 SVENSSON & WALLENSTEEN, supra note 1, at 16-17. 
37 Id. at 16. 
38 Id. at 17. 
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parties to resolve their issues, but the deadlines can also lead to weak agreements 
that are ineffective long term.39 
Other mediators choose to foster communication and allow parties to work 
on their own schedule. President Carter used this method while mediating a dispute 
between Sudan and Uganda. He would meet with each party independently, 
presenting them with a comprehensive document that addressed all the contentious 
issues. Using the single document approach, he would allow the parties to modify 
the agreement and then take those changes to the opposing party. By not pressuring 
the parties, he actually led them to a comprehensive agreement ahead of 
schedule.40 Unfortunately, a fostering comprehensive approach is not always 
effective. It is important for a mediator to set realistic goals at the outset of the 
mediation. Sometimes small concessions and trust building agreements are all that 
is really required.41 
Mode of a mediation is not only a factual determination, but also a stylistic 
consideration. It is not uncommon for go-between mediators to avoid the media 
entirely. Building trust can be difficult when the parties fear that their 
communications may be leaked to the media.42 Alternatively, there are some 
benefits to using the media. Press releases and press conferences can be an 
effective way of quashing rumors and avoiding misinformation. As media becomes 
more prevalent in modern society, a mediator must recognize both the good role 
and the bad role that media can play.43  
When deciding what issues to address in a mediation, it is possible to 
define them narrowly or broadly. Ideally a mediator will be able to establish an all-
encompassing peace agreement that the parties can agree on. Reality does not 
                                                 
39 Id. at 18. 
40 Id. at 18. 
41 SVENSSON & WALLENSTEEN, supra note 1, at 18 
42 Id. at 19. 
43 Id. at 20. 
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always make that possible.44 Some of the most difficult issues to resolve at the 
negotiation table are matters of justice and assignment of blame. Parties are 
reluctant to admit fault in most situations. This admission could lead to monetary 
or even criminal responsibility later on for human rights violations or damages 
incurred during the war.45 Generally, responsibility for aggression is placed on the 
losing party by the winning party after an armed conflict. Two examples are the 
Treaty of Versailles after World War I, placing the blame on Germany, and the 
peace treaty signed with Japan after World War II.46  
Mediators generally make a value judgment on whether or not to include 
fault or human rights provisions in their negotiations. Sometimes it is more 
important to bring an end to the fighting than it is to assign blame. While 
mediators should rely on principles elicited from international law, the mediator 
has a choice to decide which principles are most important to achieve a result.47  
 
V. GOING IN: THE DIPLOMACY OF ENTRY 
 
Entering into an international mediation can be problematic. Not all parties 
want outside intervention. Even parties who request a mediator may not be able to 
agree on the terms of how the mediation will be handled. The circumstances under 
which mediation is entered into can be a determining factor of whether or not the 
mediation will be effective.48 
In the aforementioned case involving Burma/Myanmar and Bangladesh, 
the mediation was actually requested by the two countries. The Bangladeshi 
government requested assistance to deal with the 250,000 refugees who fled into 
their country. Tensions between the two neighbors were increasing and needed to 
be defused. Both parties were willing to work together towards a solution, but 
                                                 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 21-22. 
46 SVENSSON & WALLENSTEEN, supra note 1, at 22. 
47 Id. at 23. 
48 Id. at 25. 
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needed an intermediary to ensure that a deal was made. This need is the reason Jan 
Eliasson came in. He was able to broker a deal between the two parties that 
diffused the situation.49 
On Eliasson’s first trip to Sudan, he was actually requested by an aid group 
that was working in the country. Fighting had disrupted aid distributions, and 
many civilians were in danger of starvation. By appealing to the United Nations, 
the aid group was able to acquire Mr. Eliasson’s services. Since the request was 
made by an aid group through the United Nations, and the mission was 
humanitarian in nature, Eliasson was well received by the parties involved.50  
Gaining entry into the Iraq-Iran conflict was far more difficult. When the 
neighbors went to war, the United Nations determined early on that they needed to 
step in and take measures to end the conflict. What became known as the Palme 
Mission, after Olof Palme, the head representative, was originally mandated by the 
UN Security Council. Iran was not receptive to this mandate.51 The Iranians 
believed that the Security Council was biased towards Iraq and would not 
recognize Iran’s will. As a way to skirt this issue, the Secretary-General ended up 
issuing his own mandate to initiate mediation proceedings. Even though the 
wording of the Secretary-General’s mandate was practically verbatim to that of the 
Security-Counsel, Iran was willing to accept it.52 This is a prime example of how 
important mandates and the form of entry into mediation truly are.  
Entry into the Azerbaijan conflict also affected the outcome of the 
mediation. At the time Mr. Eliasson was working for the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The organization was not well respected, but 
wanted to establish a positive reputation. In an effort to enter the fray, the OSCE 
organized a committee to mediate the dispute and set up a conference to gather the 
parties. Unfortunately, the conference never happened and Eliassion played a 
                                                 
49 Id. at 26. 
50 Id. at 27. 
51 SVENSSON & WALLENSTEEN, supra note 1, at 27-28. 
52 Id. at 28. 
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minimal role in the resolution of the conflict.53 Weak organizations providing weak 
mandates are a recipe for failure. 
Eliasson’s second mission to Darfur was a particularly interesting one. 
Fighting resumed in 2003 between the Sudanese government and rebel groups. It 
took over three years and a staggering number of civilian deaths for the 
international community to take notice.54 Eventually a collective effort between the 
United Nations, the African Union and a number of other African countries moved 
into action. They established a mandate that built on previous mediation efforts 
conducted by the African Union. With such a wide base of support, including 
international and regional powers, the conflicting parties agreed to the mediation.55 
Parties can be motivated to request mediation for a variety of reasons. 
Svensson and Wallensteen believe that three motivations predominate. One reason 
is that the cost of continuing the conflict is too high. Whether the costs are 
monetary or humanitarian, at some point parties decide that it is better to end the 
conflict than carry it on indefinitely.56 Another reason that parties will request 
assistance from third parties is the primary parties’ inability to handle the conflict 
on their own. This is especially prevalent in intrastate conflicts. When the 
government or rebel faction feels threatened they may request aid to maintain the 
status quo.57  
Lastly, both parties need a third party that they can trust. Obviously 
conflicting parties may have a difficult time trusting one another, especially in an 
armed conflict. If there is a desire to end the conflict, the insertion of a trustworthy 
third party in between the primary parties can be more effective Trust can lead to 
open and honest communications, which tend to lead to resolution.58 One of the 
                                                 
53 Id. at 28-29. 
54 Id. at 29. 
55 Id. at 29. 
56 SVENSSON & WALLENSTEEN, supra note 1, at 30-31. 
57 Id. at 31. 
58 Id.  
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main reasons that mediation efforts between Iraq and Iran failed was that Iran did 
not trust the UN. This lack of trust undermined the whole process.59 
Offering mediation assistance also depends on a variety of factors. 
International organizations or outside parties may not feel inclined to interfere if 
their interests are not in danger. The authors identify three factors. First, there has 
to be interest on behalf of the mediator and the mediator’s organization to become 
involved. Mediators may be interested in certain conflicts because they see these 
conflicts as a way to build their reputation. They may also avoid conflicts that they 
feel will ultimately end in failure. Organizations also have their own agendas. As 
mentioned earlier OSCE became involved in the Azerbaijan conflict to increase its 
status as a legitimate organization. These considerations play an important role in 
the initial offer of assistance.60 
Another important factor is the cost of the conflict. The higher the human, 
political and economic costs of a conflict, the more likely outsiders will become 
involved. Darfur provides the perfect example of how high conflict costs forced 
international action.61 After a wave of reports on the human suffering occurring in 
the region, strong public reaction forced the hands of many world powers. Even 
though the conflict in Darfur had been raging for years, it was not until the costs 
became unacceptable to the international community that that community finally 
stepped in.62 
Likelihood of success is the final consideration that outsiders will assess 
before offering mediation. The dynamics of a conflict may be too complex for a 
favorable outcome to be reached. If a mediator feels that his efforts may be 
successful, he is  more likely to step in. A lot of these determinations depend on 
                                                 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 33. 
61 SVENSSON & WALLENSTEEN, supra note 1, at 33 
62 Id. at 33-34. 
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the nature and timing of the conflict. Availability of resources to carry out the 
mediation can also affect the likelihood of success.63 
 
VI. GOING ABOUT: THE DIAGNOSTICS OF DIPLOMACY 
 
Initial assessments by mediators are a vital aspect of any mediation. These 
can be developed through meeting with all parties, pre-negotiations and an internal 
analysis based on the accumulated facts.64 Timing of these early stages is 
important. Mediators would like to begin the process when there is some 
momentum towards a resolution. 
Primary parties must be ready for mediation in order for radiation to be 
successful. Both government and non-government actors must show a willingness 
to communicate. Generally, the party with the upper hand in the conflict is the least 
likely to mediate. Governments tend to be interested in mediation when their 
territorial integrity or power is threatened.65 Non-government parties, such a rebel 
groups, can be much harder to understand. These groups tend to be disorganized 
and lack a rigid command structure. Finding the appropriate leaders to represent 
their party’s position has proven to be difficult.66 
Regional powers must also be interested in resolving the conflict in 
question. Neighboring countries rely on each other for economic and political 
support. When a conflict creates instability and threatens a neighbor’s interests, 
regional powers are much more likely to become involved.67 Russia played a major 
role in resolving the conflict in Azerbaijan by leaning heavily on the Azeri 
government. Saudi Arabia also supported mediation efforts between Iran and Iraq 
because of the Saudis feared that the spread of conflict may lead to unrest between 
                                                 
63 Id. at 34. 
64 Id. at 37. 
65 Id. at 38-39. 
66 SVENSSON & WALLENSTEEN, supra note 1, at 39-40. 
67 Id. at 40. 
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Sunnis and Shias.68 Despite being motivated by self-interest in most cases, regional 
actors are effective proponents of mediation, especially if they are powerful.  
The international community also needs to be ready for intervention to 
increase the chances of success. Mandates from the UN Security Council and the 
Secretary-General hold a lot of weight in much of the world. They provided the 
mandates for a majority of the cases that Eliasson worked on. While some 
countries, such as Iran, view the UN’s intervention with skepticism, the mandate is 
usually enough for a mediator to establish a beginning.69 Unfortunately the 
international community is not always on the same page. On more than one 
occasion Western powers have been at odds with Russia and China over an 
appropriate course of action. In the end, readiness of the primary parties, regional 
powers and international organizations is ideal when initiating mediation.70 This is 
much easier said than done. 
Once a mediation has begun, a mediator’s next step is to identify the issues 
to be discussed. The mediator must break down general terms into concrete 
positions. Once concrete positions have been established, those positions must be 
clarified so that both parties understand what the other is looking for.71 Defining 
the underlying issues of the conflict can be difficult. Both parties have conflicting 
goals and views of the dispute. Much of the information is gathered in one-on-one 
meetings with the opposing sides.72 
Darfur presented a uniquely difficult situation for Eliasson. While the 
government had an established leader and power structure, the rebels were a 
fractured group. Trying to find a unified voice was fruitless. The best Eliasson 
could do was assemble a conglomeration of the different group’s leaders. He spent 
a great deal of time speaking with the leaders to try to establish a coherent 
                                                 
68 Id. at 41. 
69 Id. at 42. 
70 Id. at 42-43. 
71 SVENSSON & WALLENSTEEN, supra note 1, at 43. 
72 Id. at 44. 
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platform. Instead of focusing on broad goals, he focused on the issues. By using 
the issue-based approach, he was able to unite a fractious group. While the parties 
could not agree on the ultimate strategy, they were able to agree on a number on 
contentious issues that needed to be addressed.73 
Identifying actors in a conflict is an important step in mediation. Including 
or excluding certain parties can help steer negotiations. Darfur proved to be an 
example of a failed inclusion strategy. Eliasson and his team thought it would be 
beneficial to include all of the rebel groups in the mediation process. 
Unfortunately, most of the rebel groups did not get along with one another. While 
they could agree on issues, many important parties did not attend the mediation 
because they could not work together. Choosing to include the wrong parties 
greatly hindered the negotiations and played a role in their eventual failure.74 
Entry into a mediation can also be a stimulus for parties to resolve their 
dispute. When a well-respected mediator enters the scene, parties are generally 
encouraged that a resolution is in sight.75 The window of opportunity to use entry 
to the mediator’s advantage is a small one. Proper calculations must be made on 
behalf of the mediator as to the timing of the intervention. He must approach the 
entry in a manner that both parties respect.76  
 
VII. GOING ON: THE INSTRUMENTS OF MEDIATION 
 
For any mediation to be successful, the mediator must build confidence 
between the parties. A healthy and constructive climate is crucial. Eliasson 
believes that the parties need to be comfortable in order to allow for an open and 
honest discourse.77 Part of establishing comfort is through cultural sensitivity. 
While the parties do not necessarily have to be of the same race or ethnic 
                                                 
73 Id. at 44-46. 
74 Id. at 46-47. 
75 Id. at 48. 
76 SVENSSON & WALLENSTEEN, supra note 1, at 49. 
77 Id. at 53. 
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background, understanding and respecting cultural boundaries is important for a 
mediator. This behavior will help the mediator build rapport with both parties.78 
A sense of humor and an informal setting can also be beneficial in 
mediations. These factors can help build trust and comfort between the parties. 
Inviting the parties to an informal breakfast or lunch can give the mediator an 
opportunity to put the client at ease and gather information. Informality can, 
however, backfire if the mediator is not careful. Some parties view informality as a 
sign of weakness and an informal process could undermine their faith in the 
process.79 
Establishing principles early can help a mediator gain acceptance by the 
parties. These principles can arise from any number of sources, including the 
mandate or international law.80 Principles provide the foundation for the mediation. 
Oddly enough, in humanitarian situations, legal principles play a minimal role. A 
mediator must rely on his credibility or that of his organization.81 
There are two main approaches that the authors propose for formulating 
proposals to resolve conflicts. One is a comprehensive approach and the other is 
step-by-step. When a mediator attempts to use the comprehensive approach, he 
tries to resolve the dispute and all related issues completely at the same time. This 
process can be undermined by distrust and hostility between the parties.82 A step-
by-step approach focuses on agreeing to small, trust building compromises initially 
and then building from there. Building from procedural compromises can foster 
confidence between the parties.83 Hopefully this confidence will lead to 
compromise on substantive issues. 
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The media can be an important tool in any mediator’s arsenal. Using the 
media effectively can show that the mediator is up to date with recent 
developments and understands the parties’ positions. Controlled leaks can even 
affect the priority of agenda items.84 Media coverage of a mediation is also 
important because it puts pressure on the parties. When the outside world is 
following every move the parties make, this attention raises expectations.85 Some 
parties will be hesitant to walk away without agreement for fear of public backlash. 
Addressing issues of justice is a difficult task for any mediator. Those 
issues are a sensitive topic that can derail a mediation if not handled properly.86 
Justice encompasses a wide range of issues including fault, reparations, public 
perception and even criminal implications. Sometimes it is best for a mediator to 
avoid the issue of justice entirely. Especially in armed conflicts, ending the 
fighting is more important than assigning blame for who started it.87 Eliasson 
recommends that a mediator be open and honest about his perceptions of the 
conflict. The mediator is supposed to be the “moral authority” in the room.88 Being 
honest will help build trust, but the mediator must also retain impartiality.  
Keeping the parties at the table can sometimes be as difficult as getting 
them there in the first place. Svensson and Wallensteen propose a few methods that 
they have seen succeed. Momentum is crucial. If parties see progress in the 
mediation, they are more likely to stay at the table. Stalemates lead to excuses for 
exit.89 It is also important for a mediator to assess the credibility of threats to 
withdraw. Eliasson has gone as far as posting sources at local airports to gather 
information on outgoing flights. When a party threatened to withdraw but did not 
have a plane ready to leave, Eliasson was able to call their bluff and push through 
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the negotiations.90 Lastly, a mediator can highlight the value of the mediation. 
Effectively conveying the importance of an agreement to the two parties can be 
enough to keep them at the table.91 This is where the media can be effective tool.  
Reframing issues is also an important skill of any mediator. Being able to 
describe issues in a variety of different ways can be an effective way to move 
negotiations along. Different words have different effects on parties. The words 
can mean the difference between a successful negotiation and the breakdown of 
talks. Having a strong vocabulary and a good translator are tools all international 
mediators should have.92 
 
VIII. GOING TOGETHER: THE CONTEXT OF MEDIATION 
 
In the world of international mediation there can be multiple dispute 
resolution efforts operating simultaneously in a single conflict. All of these efforts 
rarely work cooperatively.93 Being aware of the other operations and their 
mandates can help a mediator understand the complexities of the conflict and 
develop his strategy accordingly. Ideally a mediation will have the support of all 
parties involved; internationally, regionally and locally. Having the UN involved is 
one method.94 Eliasson has also been known to meet with regional actors face-to-
face. By keeping the actors informed they are generally more receptive to the 
process and are less likely to interfere.95 
Becoming the leading international mediation effort is important to 
success. This will lend more credibility to the mediator and his/her organization. 
Forging international support is one way to achieve this goal. Coordination is 
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another. Building a united front can give the mediators leverage and allows them to 
pool their resources, which are important to any mediation.96 Having a strong 
mandate from a respected organization that is not afraid to assert itself is important 
to take the leading role in any mediation. 
The international community can be used in a variety of ways to assist a 
mediation. They can incentivize the parties to end the dispute through monetary or 
other means.97 While Eliasson does not believe in using threats to motivate parties, 
he is receptive to the idea of using the international community as “drums in the 
distance.”98 Potential sanctions, reduced aid or even military intervention can 
motivate parties to work together. International mandates can even provide the go-
between leverage over the parties. If one of the parties has other interests at stake 
outside of a given mediation, international organizations have been known to 
leverage assistance for cooperation in the mediation.99  
As mentioned earlier, an international mediator can use the media to his 
advantage. Especially in matters of public interest, bringing attention to the 
mediation can encourage parties to cooperate. Oddly, this attention is usually an 
ineffective method of bringing the international community together.100 Using 
international principles is also necessary to legitimizing a mediator. Credibility for 
the mediation will be undermined if the parties and international community do not 
believe a mediation is guided by commonly accepted principles.101  
There are three main forms of international mediation that the author’s 
espouse. One is the international conference. This format allows the parties’ 
delegations to officially meet at the negotiation table.102 International conferences 
provide the parties with an opportunity to enumerate their positions and also 
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provide the mediator with an opportunity to meet with the parties one-on-one, 
essentially in a caucus.103 While international conferences can be highly effective 
to clarify positions, these conferences are difficult to organize and rarely result in a 
resolution. In Eliasson’s experience, few lasting resolutions have been made at this 
type of conference.104 
Two formats that have been more effective for Eliasson are shuttle 
diplomacy and direct communication between the parties.105 Opening lines of 
direct communication outside of the negotiating table can be difficult, but 
effective. Mr. Eliasson prefers to mediate with parties at the same location, but 
shuttle diplomacy is a popular method among other international mediators. Direct 
access to the major players in a dispute is necessary. Showing a willingness to 
physically step into a conflict zone, or the home territory of a party can help build 
trust and confidence in the mediator and the process itself.106 
 Inserting international mediation into a conflict is not always a guaranteed 
technique. Some conflicts have international, regional or local players that will 
undermine the process. This meddling can render the entire process ineffective. 
One example used by the authors is that of Russia in Azerbaijan.107 Mr. Eliasson 
was working for a regional organization that lacked respect and real power, OSCE. 
Since Azerbaijan shared a border with Russia and was a former Soviet republic, 
the former super power took a leading interest in resolving the conflict. Despite 
efforts by Eliasson to incorporate the Russians into his process, the Russians 
actively worked against him. Instead of relying on the mediation process, Russia 
used the looming threat of military intervention to lean on the Azeri government.108 
They had the power and resources that Eliasson’s organization lacked. Operating 
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in the shadow of an uncooperative major regional/international power can 
complicate a mediator’s efforts significantly.109 
 
IX. GOING OUT: THE DIPLOMACY OF EXIT 
 
Exiting an international mediation can be as difficult as entering one. 
While Eliasson does not support the concept, a mediator can threaten withdrawal. 
Threats present a number of problems. If the threats are not serious, the mediator’s 
trust, credibility and momentum will all be undermined if the parties call the 
mediator’s bluff. When that happens to a mediator, he becomes entirely 
ineffective. Sometimes a threat to withdraw is the trigger one party needed to break 
off negotiations.110 
Timing the exit from a mediation is important. There are some signs that 
can indicate to a mediator it is time to end his efforts. Obviously, an agreement is 
one indicator.111 Another indicator is a lack of political will on behalf of the 
parties. If the parties lose interest in a political solution, the likelihood of coming 
to an agreement is minimal.112  
Just because one mediator terminates his or her efforts does not mean that 
conflict resolution efforts will end entirely. Finding a successor should be a top 
priority of the mediator and his organization. While the mediator cannot force 
anyone to continue his efforts, his advice can be crucial.113 Approaching entities 
such as the UN or international political/aid organizations is one option. The nature 
of the dispute will determine who should succeed the mediator.114 
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X. GOING AHEAD: LESSONS FOR MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
Much of the final chapter is a summary of conclusions and analyses 
already covered in the previous chapters. There are some interesting conclusions 
that the authors have drawn that are worth noting. Svensson and Wallensteen 
encourage ideas that evaluate the success of mediations to expand their horizons. 
Mediation results should not be judged only on the merits of their final 
agreements. Initiating discourse or helping parties understand each other can be 
just as important as a comprehensive peace agreement. Mediation results are too 
nuanced to be evaluated in rigid terms.115 
Resources are vital to any mediation. In order for a mediation to be 
successful, a mediator must be provided with enough resources to adequately carry 
out the proceeding. These resources include not only monetary resources, but also 
political, administrative, academic and human. One way to ensure there are 
adequate resources is cooperation.116 When the international community can 
cooperate and pool their resources, there is a much greater chance of success.  
To end the substantive portion of the book, the authors draw a series of 
general conclusions that they believe can improve the practice and study of 
mediation. The first conclusion is that learning should be an integral part of the 
mediation process. Mediators should always be evaluating and learning from their 
experiences and those of other mediators. Working as a team can provide 
mediators with an opportunity to learn new skills and allow the use of 
complementary skill sets to improve the quality of the mediation.117  
Mandates are a vital part of the mediation process. They provide the 
foundation for the entire process. Considering their importance, mediators and 
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their organizations should take care in crafting them. A carefully crafted mandate 
can provide the mediator with a great deal of power and leverage.118  
Style is an important consideration for any mediator. A mediator should be 
aware of scope, method, mode and focus at all times, even during the creation of 
the mandate. Understanding the different styles will provide a mediator with a 
greater array of tools to use. It is also important to note that style is fluid. Just 
because the mediator employs one style initially does not mean that style has to be 
used throughout. If something is not working, the mediator must assess the 
situation and adjust accordingly.119  
Assessing the humanitarian nature of a conflict can also assist a mediator 
in coming to a resolution. Generally humanitarian matters are much less 
contentious than political ones. Agreement on humanitarian issues can build a 
foundation for future negotiations. Momentum from the humanitarian mediation 
could be parlayed into the political mediation.120 
Initiating direct dialogue should be the goal for all mediators. Once direct 
dialogue is initiated, the mediator should work to sustain this dialogue for as long 
as possible. Direct negotiations have traditionally been the most successful.121  
Svensson and Wallensteen strongly believe that greater institutional 
support for international mediation is needed. There are not enough organizations 
that promote the process. A majority of current mediations occur on a piece meal 
basis, dependent on the resources and will of the parties. If there was a permanent 
office from which mediations could operate, cohesion and effectiveness could be 
improved dramatically. This would also provide mediators with a direct line to the 
media. This access would allow mediators to manage information more 
effectively.122  
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As mediation becomes more prevalent in conflict resolution, mediators 
must always be concerned with whom to include and exclude. Conflicts have 
become increasingly complex since the end of the Cold War. There are fewer 
united fronts and more conflicts involving multiple parties. It is important to 
address the issue at the outset of the mediation through the mandate. Choosing the 
correct parties to include will further the chances of success.123 
The authors agree that mediators should also be aware of any parallel 
mediation or negotiation processes. Awareness may allow the mediator to integrate 
their efforts, and could also provide insight to a party’s strategy or position. 
Understanding other parallel efforts can ensure that both groups work together and 
avoid conflict.124 
Not only are mediators dealing with interparty conflicts, but they should 
also be aware of intraparty conflicts. Especially in political cases, there can be a 
number of different interests within a single party influencing decision-making. 
The mediator needs to address these conflicts. This is one area in which the authors 
would like to see significantly more research.125 
Lastly, the authors believe that it is important for any mediator or 
organization to be flexible in regards to outcomes and exits. As mentioned 
previously, mediation is a complex process with nuances that cannot be easily 
evaluated. The process itself can be a victory in hostile situations. Agreements are 
usually ideal, but it is difficult to assess their short and long term value. Most 
importantly, the mediation process should progress, not frustrate, the situation. If a 
mediator achieves nothing else, he should at least exit with the status quo intact. 
Only when a mediator frustrates the resolution process should his efforts be 
deemed a failure.126  
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The remaining pages of the book are dedicated to providing a chronology 
of all the disputes discussed in the book. For anyone interested in the process and 
stages of negotiation, this chronology will provide a wealth of information. This 
section provides the reader with a greater understanding of the conflicts. It may be 
beneficial to read this section before the rest of the book. Due to the complex 
nature of the disputes the authors chose, a comprehensive understanding of those 
disputes will allow the reader to focus on the styles and strategies Eliasson used. 
 
XI. CONCLUSION 
 
From an academic standpoint, The Go-Between: Jan Eliasson and the 
Styles of Mediation by Svensson and Wallensteen presents a well thought-out, 
albeit limited look into international mediation. While the book focuses heavily on 
international political and humanitarian mediation, the principles discussed can 
apply to any international mediation. Scope, method, mode, and focus are 
considerations for all mediations. Determining the issues to focus on, the people to 
involve, what style to use and what format to follow must be done by every 
mediator for every mediation. These choices can dramatically affect the 
mediation’s chances of success. The format may require the reader to extrapolate 
some of the examples or theories in order to practically apply them to other areas. 
Anyone familiar with the field should not have difficulty doing so. 
For an academic book, this is actually an interesting read. The authors do a 
great job of interweaving Eliasson’s stories with academic theory. It is well written 
and the examples they chose present a number of complex issues. These issues are 
interesting enough to keep you reading and are presented in a way that does not 
make it feel like you are reading a textbook. Being able to see the theory in action 
makes the theory easier to grasp. 
One particularly useful aspect of the book is the insight from Jan Eliasson. 
There are a number of quotes from his official reports, personal diaries and 
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interviews. It becomes clear early on that Eliasson is very good at what he does. 
He has participated in enough international mediations that even the brief snippets 
of his knowledge provide the reader with a clearer understanding of the entire 
process. Even if the rest of the book was poor quality, which it is not, Jan 
Eliasson’s insight would be worth the price of admission. 
Considering the breadth and quality of the content, this book should be 
considered a steal. For less than twenty dollars the reader receives an overview of 
mediation theories, as well as some interesting stories about their application in the 
real world. Many other academic books on mediation cost significantly more. 
While the book’s focus on international political and humanitarian mediation 
appears to limit its practical use, that would be a mistaken assumption. 
Practitioners familiar with the field will realize that most of the principles being 
discussed apply to all mediations; especially international mediations.  At only 164 
pages, the book is a quick read. There are helpful charts and chronologies that 
assist in understanding some of the more complex matters in the book. Overall 
Svensson and Wallensteen put together a polished and useful book for practitioners 
and academics alike. Even people with a passing interest in the topic will find the 
book interesting and easy enough to read in one sitting. The low cost and high 
substantive value makes this book a worthwhile addition to any mediation 
collection. 
